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The War in Chechnya and the New Russian State 
The West's reactions to the Russian 
military campaign to restore Mos- 
cow's control over the breakaway 
Chechen Republic have been ambiva- 
lent and confused. On the one hand, 
Western governments emphasized 
that Chechnya was an internal Russian 
affair and that the Russian government 
had a right to defend its territorial in- 
tegrity. On the other hand, the meth- 
ods used by the Russian government 
shocked international public opinion. 
Concern mounted over massive hu- 
man rights violations and excessive 
use of force. On top of that, having 
moved tens of thousands of troops into 
Chechnya, without prior notification 
to member states of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Eu- 
rope, Moscow was found in violation 
of OSCE rules which it had pledged to 
observe. 
Part of this confusion reflected an 
inherent conflict between two princi- 
ples of modem international law: de- 
fense of national sovereignty and 
protection of human rights. But the 
Chechen war also highlighted the dan- 
gerous and unstable condition in 
which Russia found itself after three 
years of post-communist reforms. 
Since 1991, the Yeltsin government 
had been widely seen in the West as the 
best possible vehicle for democratic 
and market reforms in Russia, as well 
as for establishing a friendly or allied 
relationship with the USA and other 
Western countries. Yet, this very gov- 
ernment was now waging a brutal war 
in the Caucasus and had failed to pro- 
vide a serious legal case for it. In addi- 
tion, the government was increasingly 
resorting to authoritarian methods in 
its domestic policy and developing an 
assertive foreign policy which was at 
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odds with Western goals and prefer- 
ences. 
There is a contradiction here. Are we 
observing a reversal of the democratic 
reform process in Russia? Or, are the 
war in Chechnya and other disturbing 
Russian developments temporary 
aberrations from, or perhaps a pause 
in, the continuing movement toward 
markets and democracy? Some 
observers prefer to look beyond 
Chechnya: after all, similar events 
have taken place in Western democra- 
cies, and are perhaps not unexpected 
in a new and unstable democracy like 
Russia, with its ingrained authoritar- 
ian and imperial traditions. 
Whatever the causes, new authori- 
tarianism is a very serious threat to 
Russia's democratic gains. But it is 
worthwhile to look for the sources of 
this ominous trend, not just in the stub- 
bornness of old Soviet ways and the 
activities of anti-reform forces, as is the 
prevalent mode, but, more impor- 
tantly, in the reform project itself, its 
premises and its social base. 
Transition from communism in 
Russia, as well as in other former So- 
viet and satellite countries, has been 
shaped by a combination of factors. To 
name just a few, there are the follow- 
ing: the widely perceived need of 
societies to develop market and demo- 
cratic institutions; pressures of the 
world economy in its current pro-mar- 
ket and anti-statist phase; the rising 
tide of nationalism; and the processes 
of transformation of communist-era 
elites and their methods of rule. 
In its earlier stages, the transition 
could be easily characterized as 
"democratic," since the combined im- 
pact of these factors seemed to push 
Eastern European countries towards 
Western-style democracy. Democracy 
was seen as a necessary condition for 
effecting a shift toward markets, for 
being accepted into the Western club, 
for replacement of the empire with 
new nation-states, and even for effect- 
ing a regrouping and a rationalization 
among elites. After a few years, how- 
ever, the danger became clear that de- 
mocracy may be sacrificed as an 
obstacle to the realization of other 
goals. "Shock therapy" and the con- 
comitant push to integrate Russia into 
the world economy seem to have taken 
precedence. 
Simultaneous pursuit of both politi- 
cal and economic liberalization has 
been a hallmark of Russian reforms 
since Gorbachev's perestroika. Russia, 
striving to emerge from the Soviet cri- 
sis, needed both, just as it needed an 
end to the Cold War and a drastic de- 
militarization of economy and society. 
It seemed clear that to weaken the bu- 
reaucracy's stranglehold on society, to 
pull the economy from stagnation, and 
to narrow the gap between the state 
and the people, it was necessary to 
move toward both political and eco- 
nomic freedom at the same time. 
However, contradictions between 
political and economic components of 
the reform project soon became appar- 
ent. When the economy ground to a 
halt in 1989, the Soviet government 
turned to its habitualmethod: it looked 
for solutions at the people's expense. 
"We live as well as we work," declared 
Gorbachev's economic adviser Leonid 
Abalkin with a remarkable insensitiv- 
ity to the plight of tens of millions of 
hard-working but underpaid Soviets. 
The new message from the govern- 
ment was that the economy was in cri- 
sis because people demanded too 
much and worked too little, and that 
even the modest Soviet living stand- 
ards were largely undeserved. 
The first version of "shock therapy" 
was launched not by Yeltsin's reform 
cabinet, but by Gorbachev's Prime 
Minister Valentin Pavlov in the spring 
of 1991, as part of the general shift to 
the right inSoviet politics. The govern- 
ment's assault on people's incomes 
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and savings went hand in hand with 
the escalation of repressive measures 
against democratic activists, national- 
ists in the Baltic republics, business- 
men and others. When Pavlov and 
other key figures in the Soviet govern- 
ment staged their coup against Gor- 
bachev and Yeltsin in August, their 
crackdown on political liberties was 
combined with a promise to continue 
market reforms. They were not trying 
to save socialism-they were looking 
for an authoritarian road to capitalism. 
The dominant Soviet elites saw noth- 
ing wrong with the institutions of pri- 
vate ownership and market exchange, 
so long as the development of those 
institutions helped them keep and in- 
crease their power. 
The narrow power interests of the 
top Soviet oligarchy were so naked in 
that coup that the plotters were be- 
trayed even by the army and the KGB. 
in its wake, drastically changed the 
situation. The underdogs were now at 
the top, busily organizing new institu- 
tions of power-building new states, 
privatizing state assets, and establish- 
ing new rules of the game. The rebels' 
transition from outside to inside the 
Kremlin walls profoundly changed 
their attitudes to democracy and bu- 
reaucracy in Russia. There were also 
increasing pressures from the world 
economy on developments in Russia. 
These stemmed in part from the grow- 
ing dependence between the old Soviet 
Union and the rest of the world. The 
great reforms reflect Russia's re-entry 
into the world economy and its at- 
tempts to find a better position within 
that economy. 
There are many aspects regarding 
the liberation of Russian society from 
the chains of the post totalitarian State 
which are important, but I would like 
- - - -  
The abolition of the USSR, and the formation of new 
independent states in its wake, drastically changed the situation. 
The underdogs were now at the top, busily organizing new 
institutions of power-building new states, privatizing state 
assets, and establishing new rules of the game. 
But what confronted and defeated the 
coup was not just a critical mass of citi- 
zens who had lost their fear of the state 
and were determined to see freedom 
prevail, but, just as importantly, a criti- 
cal mass of second-rank Soviet elites 
who were interested in reforms to the 
extent that reforms opened paths to the 
top for them. For these elites, the coup 
meant a rebuff to their climb and a 
reimposition of the old pecking order. 
As underdogs to those in the Kremlin, 
however, they were able to make com- 
mon cause with the broader array of 
social forces pressing for radical re- 
forms. Boris Yeltsin, with his 
nomenclatura background, his sudden 
conversion to the cause of radical re- 
forms, and his image as a populist rebel 
fighting to free Russia from the yoke of 
the Soviet state, symbolized the crucial 
elite component of the new Russian 
revolution. 
The abolition of the USSR, and the 
formation of new independent states 
to focus on the issue of post-Soviet 
bureaucrats; various bureaucratic 
elites who inherited power from the 
old Soviet State. The new liberal 
project of Soviet reforms had the ap- 
pearance of a utopia, until enough im- 
portant bureaucratic elites in the 
Soviet Union discovered that this 
project fit their group interests very 
well. 
It must be emphasized that this 
project does not involve just bureau- 
crats. The new risingelites, owingtheir 
new-found prosperity to the growing 
market economy, were just as impor- 
tant. But for every private entrepre- 
neur making money in the new market 
gains, there were at least ten people 
who were former first-secretaries on 
numerous party committees, manag- 
ers of State enterprises, KGB officers, 
or former generals. The Russian politi- 
cal scene was teeming with people 
who had power in the old system and 
were now attempting to recast that 
power in new terms. There was a new 
bourgeoisie, a new private sector, and 
new entrepreneurs with mixed ori- 
gins, but origin in Russia gives one a 
leg up in comparison to newcomers. 
To become a full-fledged new entre- 
preneur in Russia today is much more 
difficult than it was five years ago. 
While it was necessary for the most 
part to be somebody in the old system 
in order to be somebody in the new 
market game, a new bourgeoisie was 
able to develop and is exploiting the 
opportunities of the growing private 
economy. As well, managers of trans- 
forming State enterprises formed a 
very important part of the post-Soviet 
elite. Some of these enterprises were 
stillstate-owned and others were tech- 
nically private, but in reality a strange 
combination of mixed private-owner- 
ship, employee-owned, and State- 
owned prevailed. 
In terms of administrative structure, 
the executive apparatus of the state 
had also been recast. Instead of one 
state organization, there now are some 
15 states with Russia being the largest. 
There has been a tremendous expan- 
sion of state executive machinery and 
the number of people in the executive 
bureaucracy today is much larger. Re- 
liable counts are not available, but it is 
at least 50 or 60 percent larger than it- 
was at the time of the Soviet Union, 
when governmental operations were 
centralized. There are new elective 
members in the 15 parliaments in place 
over the old Soviet Union. Groups of 
people are preparing for elections and 
thereby competing for the political 
limelight. 
Finally, military elites are still domi- 
nant, with Russian military elites be- 
ing much more numerous and more 
influential than their contemporaries 
in other former Soviet Republics. 
Altogether, considering changes in 
Russia from the populist point of view 
(e.g. people getting the right to vote, 
the development of the free press, citi- 
zen involvement in politics, the forma- 
tion of associations, and the growth of 
civil society) in isolation from other 
factors, creates an inaccurate picture of 
democracy. 
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If we attempt to the measure the 
amount of power that the rank and file 
citizen in Russia has today, we come to 
the conclusion that he or she has much 
less power thanbefore the great reform 
or before the great democratic revolu- 
tion. Elites certainly have much more 
power than they ever had when they 
were part of a single hierarchical struc- 
ture, run from the centre by the com- 
munist party, and supervised by the 
politburo and the KGB. What is evi- 
dent is that a complex of different 
power centres are emerging, and they 
are all competing for and utilizing the 
free press. There is a proliferation of 
new coalitions and parties. The Presi- 
dent of Russia is trying to emerge as 
all-powerful, or as he says, "number 
one." In some respects he is number 
one, but only in some. The limits of his 
power are all too clear. It is accurate to 
say that the great reforms have re- 
sulted in the empowerment of irnpor- 
tant elites and of new elites in the 
former Soviet society, at the expense of 
the vast majority of citizens, and at the 
expense of the civil society. 
In a great debate among Sovietolo- 
gists on whether civil society existed in 
the Soviet Union, some argued that so 
much power was concentrated in the 
hands of the party and the State that 
there was no autonomy to speak of. 
Civil society could therefore not even 
begin to develop. Other specialists 
cited developments such as increasing 
pluralisation of power in the Soviet 
Union, the growth of education, edu- 
cational standards, the emergence of 
intellectuals, and the existence of in- 
formal groups of all kinds. They like- 
wise focused on the Gorbachev era 
when civil society took a great leap 
forward. In that optic, the Gorbachev 
reforms increasingly imposed the no- 
tion of civil society on the State while 
relaxing State controls. 
More recently, civil society has be- 
come a very conservative concept. It 
takes a long time for citizens to develop 
more or less stable structures of inter- 
action and create tools to defend and 
increase their autonomy. Civil socie- 
ties do not come into existence over 
night. And if there was a civil society in 
the Soviet Union, it owed its existence 
to decades of shared experiences arid 
years of slow and painful liberaliza- 
tion. After the Soviet Union collapsed, 
a series of massive blows damaged the 
structures of that inherited civil soci- 
ety. These were economic blows 
through "shock therapy" which di- 
minished the purchasing power of the 
population. They were political blows 
in the sense that having elected the first 
head of State in a thousand years, the 
Russians immediately saw power be- 
ing re-concentrated in the hands of the 
executive, at the expense of the parlia- 
ment, and at the expense of lower 
levels of State structure. There is a very 
real sense among many Russians that 
they now have less political power 
than they had before radical reforms. 
did not previously enjoy. Among other 
things, there is a growing sense among 
the bureaucrats, especially those in- 
volved in management of enterprises, 
that there is a real possibility to become 
owners of the means of production. 
They certainly have something like a 
propriety in relationship to the new 
State which is emerging in Russia. 
Likewise, new elites in the other 
former Soviet Republics have devel- 
oped increasingly proprietary atti- 
tudes to their new States. 
Simultaneously, there is growing 
social discontent among the popula- 
tion, not only over the loss of power, 
but also over the growing chaos, the 
rising wave of crime and lawlessness, 
the loss of social prospects, the pros- 
pects of downward social mobility, the 
Nationalism enters the picture at a very propitious moment, 
because nationalism is used to just i!  or legitimize the positions of 
elites in the new regime. Building a proper new Russian State 
becomes a sacred mission which deflects questions of 
democracy, elitism, and power. 
In fact, the war in Chechnya demon- 
strates that powerlessness more than 
anything else. It is a war that has been 
waged by the executive branch agains;t 
almost total opposition of Russian 
public opinion, against the expressed 
opposition of the parliament, and 
against the expressed opposition of 
most of the media, and there is nothing 
that Russian society can do about it. If 
there was an unpopular, unsupported 
war . . . a thankless war, this is it. 
In this interesting test case, it be- 
comes clear that Russians had few 
tools to stop war. They demonstrated, 
yet they were ignored. The newspa- 
pers published scandalous accounts, 
yet the executive branch did not alter 
its policy. When parliament threat- 
ened that it would limit the power of 
the President, the President responded 
"I can disband you by constitution." So 
from the point of view of society, there 
is less societal power vis-a-vis the new 
Russian State. 
Let us return to the point of view of 
the new elites who are really in power. 
They possess new power which they 
threat of high unemployment, and the 
prospect of losing jobs. On the one 
hand, new elites have assumed power; 
on the other hand, discontented popu- 
lations have been increasingly disillu- 
sioned. A gap is growing between the 
government and the people, and be- 
tween the new States and the shattered 
and fragmented new societies. 
Nationalism enters the picture at a 
very propitious moment, because na- 
tionalism is used to justify or legitimize 
the positions of elites in the new re- 
gime. Building a proper new Russian 
State becomes a sacred mission which 
deflects questions of democracy, elit- 
ism, and power. In a recent debate on 
whether Russia should have a profes- 
sional army, the Minister of Defence 
said something very interesting: "I 
don't think that Russia really needs 
professional armies. I hate to see Rus- 
sian soldiers go to battle for money." 
Chechnya is the first war of the Rus- 
sian State in which the battle cross of 
the old Russian Imperial Army has 
been revived, so that the heroes receive 
crosses instead of stars. This is not a 
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 professional soldiers' war but a war for 
national territory. Nationalism is a very 
important symbol for the masses; to these 
millions of people who have been 
battered, whose illusions have been 
shattered, and who are profoundly in the 
dark as to what awaits them tomorrow. 
The famous work by Hannah Arendt2 
on totalitarianism emphasizes the notion 
of superfluous people. Arendt explains 
the process of the transformation of 
Western nation States into nationalist 
States, and then into imperialist States, as 
creating superfluous people. They are 
growing numbers of people who lose 
social orientation and ties with other 
human beings. They become anxious to 
join with somebody, and join new entities 
or new communities. 
We recall the serious effects of these 
processes in Western Europe. I'm afraid 
that there is a danger of similar processes 
developing in Russia. The vast majority 
of Russian citizens have opposed the war 
in Chechnya, and that opposition presents 
an interesting test. It is not easy to 
educate people in the politics of new 
imperialism. Yet, this situation represents 
only the start of the process. Russian 
society still has reasonably free 
information media. 
The television is not fully controlled. A 
fight has been pitched between the 
government and the media, and it is not 
clear who will win. If the government 
wins, and it succeeds in taming the media 
and turning it into propaganda tools to 
educate Russians in the ideology of new 
nationalism, then we may see a decline in 
opposition to wars like Chechnya. 
Russians clamoured for law and order 
when they voted for Yeltsin, and that is 
what they are getting from the Yeltsin 
government. The processes which have 
been generated by the deepening social 
and economic crisis in the new 
independent States are very dangerous. 
Nationalism is dangerous when it 
acquires extreme features in any place, 
but in Russia it is doubly dangerous 
because we are dealing with a State which 
has a dual imperial tradition. The re-
centralization of 
power in the hands of new Russian elites 
can be seen as synonymous with the 
restoration of the Soviet Empire. Even 
"shock therapy," which was supposedly 
enacted within Russia for good reasons 
was imposed on the other former Soviet 
Republics in a very authoritarian manner. 
Russia being the largest, and inheriting 
most of the Soviet assets, initiated the 
process of "shock therapy," leaving the 
others to follow or be damned. There was 
no consultation. And that happened atthe 
start, when the idea of democracy was still 
shining brightly. Now that this idea has 
lost most of its lustre and many Russians 
are talking about law and order and 
restoration of a strong State, there is a 
greater danger that an assertion of power 
in the centre may result in drastic 
repercussions for neighbouring states. 
Many of the neighbours are scared by 
what they see in Chechnya. Certainly, 
Chechnya is within Russia; but there is no 
guarantee that similar methods will not be 
used outside of Russia. 
It has been my intention in this brief 
presentation to emphasize the linkages 
between radical economic reforms and the 
imperialist trends which are emerging in 
the Russian States. I would like to 
emphasize that the linkage is to be sought 
in the self-interest of bureaucratic elites. 
Ultimately, it appears that those who are 
winning the battle for power which is 
raging in the former Soviet Union, are 
those who had power before. The old 
Soviet elites have not been dislodged. 
They have been rearranged and are using 
new tools to perpetuate and augment their 
power. So the real democratic struggles lie 
ahead and it is very important that the 
nature of those struggles are seen properly 
by Western observers. m 
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